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Introduction to the special issue “Extended Mind”

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The significance of Clark and Chalmers’ “The Extended Mind” paper (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) is that seems to have provided a high-octane shot in the arm to an “a prioristically” orientated philosophy of mind. Given that the paper had been rejected three years earlier by three major journals (Chalmers, 2008), it must have come as an enormous surprise to the authors that a veritable cottage industry (themed conferences and workshops and a steady flow of publications) has been generated by the paper’s audacious thesis. Whether or not one subscribes to the Clark–Chalmers argument (or independently to Clark (2008)) or indeed to its relatives (Susan Hurley’s “vehicle externalism;” Francesco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Alva Noé’s “enactivism;” Mark Rowlands “environmentalism;” Rob Wilson’s “locational externalism”) what cannot be denied is the palpable excitement and overall quality of the literature. This said, it was not until about 2001 that a sustained criticism began to emerge led primarily by Adams and Aizawa (2001). Until then, much of the literature could best be characterized as digesting the implications of Clark and Chalmers’ provocative thesis giving wing to other works in a similar vein. A critical pincer movement was opened up with the publication of Rob Rupert’s paper in 2004 (Rupert, 2004). Both Adams and Aizawa and Rupert consolidated their critiques culminating in Adams and Aizawa (2008) and Rupert (2009).

The extended mind literature cuts across a bewildering smorgasbord of (often overlapping) and even incompatible (Riverstein & Clark, 2009) research interests collectively known as “situated cognition” (Robbins & Aydede, 2008) and includes distributed cognition, embodied cognition, enactive cognition, and dynamic cognition – there are perhaps many more supposed distinctive research areas that would be included under the situated umbrella. Herein lies a problem. The terminology in this ever-fluid coalition is hardly settled. Hutchins’ (1996) seminal work, for example, is viewed by himself as dealing with situated cognition as a topic. Others consider his work a classic exercise in distributed cognition. Yet more see this work as grist for the extended mind mill. In discussion with Phil Robbins, the coeditor of the Cambridge Handbook to Situated Cognition, he suggested that “extended mind” talk was a species of the genus “situated cognition.” And who was I to disagree with him?: without exception, others privy to the discussion endorsed Phil’s view. As it transpires, all the papers that comprise this issue are centrally concerned with the extended mind so it is perfectly natural that the title reflects this ostensibly more focused theme. This said, it is clear that the notion of extended mind has made inroads into other domains: (a) epistemologists who view mind and epistemology as two sides to the same coin and are engaged in the project to “cognitivize epistemology” and “socialize the mind” (Goldberg, 2007; Marsh & Onof, 2008b; Prichard, in press); (b) writers with a religious sensibility (see Marsh, 2009) and; (c) a rag-bag of papers that reference the Clark–Chalmers thesis (for example, Verma, 2010). At the very least I take “extended mind” talk as being continuous with a companion themed issue of a few years back (Marsh & Onof, 2008a).

Whether one is critical of – or harbors sympathies for – the extended mind thesis, the flourish of monographs published by top-notch presses indicates that perhaps the extended mind literature that has come of age. But a word of caution: one should be skeptical of the claim that extended mind/situated cognition constitutes a paradigm shift. A senior research scientist and a collaborator of mine was bemused by the idea that the term “paradigm” was being applied to situated cognition and extended mind. “And to think we’ve been calling it,” she dryly replied, “human–computer interaction.” On the other hand, there is much to be said for Andy Clark’s view that “[M]uch of what goes on in the complex world of humans, may thus,
somewhat surprisingly, be understood in terms of so-called stigmergic algorithms” (Clark, 1996, p. 279). Stigmergy (the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment) I take to be a form of extended mind that I believe can successfully negotiate “the bounds of cognition.”

The line-up can be broadly split into two groups: those critical of extended mind and those whose work in some way takes wing from the extended mind thesis. Perhaps unusually I begin with critics rather than with the “extended minders.” The unifying topic of this first group is the vexed demarcation problem – that is, what is it that distinguishes the cognitive from the non-cognitive. First up is Weiskopf’s (2010) panoptic paper that argues for just modifications of the environment) I take to be a form of stigmergy (the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by stigmergic algorithms) (Clark, 1996, p. 279)....

The second grouping begins with Drayson (2010): she attempts to clarify the debate by examining the clearly metaphysical import of the extended mind thesis. Allen, Goldstone, Theiner (2010) extrapolate the idea of the extended mind thesis to the idea that groups are capable of cognition. The collection is rounded off by Gangopadhyay’s (2010) defence of Alva Noë’s strong sensorimotor externalism against Adams' and Aizawa’s critique.

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Once again, I wish to thank Ron Sun, Co-Editor-in-Chief of this very ecumenical forum for his support and guidance. Last, but by no means least, I want to register the sad loss of Susan Hurley who was one of the first to sign up for this issue. Her influence is very much in evidence in this collection.

References


